Dropped objects from cranes are one of the most hazardous events during the operation of the topside of offshore plants along with hydrocarbon gas explosion and fire. Although it is strongly suggested by international rules and regulations to evaluate probabilistic impact risk from dropped objects in the offshore industry, most engineers have had difficulties in estimating a reliable risk value because there is no concrete guideline on probabilistic impact risk analysis. Therefore, an algorithm to compute a reasonable probability of structural failure is proposed in this paper. Nonlinear transient finite element structural analyses for a 3D pipeline protection system on a topside module are carried out using LS-DYNA in order to get structural responses for each of the selected dropped object scenarios.
INTRODUCTION
The international standards (ISO 2010) recommend considering the following hazardous events in the design of the topside structures for offshore platforms: 1) explosion; 2) fire; 3) vessel collision; 4) impact from dropped and swinging objects, from projectiles, and from broken cables or wire; 5) helicopter impact (emergency landing or crash); and 6) the effects of accidental flooding due to compartment damage for floating structures, etc. Guidelines on probabilistic risk analysis for each specific hazard, however, haven't yet been established. Given this deficiency, a framework for probabilistic risk analysis of a FPSO (Floating, Production, Storage and Offloading) focusing on impact loads from dropped objects is proposed in this paper.
METHODOLOGY
Drop impact hazard analysis. This section describes the detailed procedure for impact risk assessment, focusing on the event of dropped objects on a topside protection system. In dropped object studies, "hazard" is defined as the rate of occurrence of impact energy due to a dropped object such as containers, valves in basket, helifuel, etc. First, all possible dropped object scenarios should be thoroughly investigated for each topside area of a specific offshore platform. Since it is beyond the scope of this study to carry out the complete hazard analysis of dropped objects for a specific FPSO, only two zones shown in Figure 1 are selected in order to give an example of hazard calculation. After choosing a set of dropped object scenarios for each topside area (Zone A and Zone B only in this study), the annual rate of occurrence for each dropped object scenario can be calculated based on the accident database for floating offshore units. The details of dropped object scenarios for the two zones are listed in Table 1 . The "hazard curve" also called "exceedance curve" for each zone is depicted in Figure 2 , which plots cumulative summation of the annual rate of occurrence sorted by the impact energy in descending order versus impact energy. Because the entire exceedance curve of Zone A is above the acceptance criteria of 10 -4 displayed by the horizontal solid blue line in Figure 2 (b), it is not necessary to install a piping protection system in Zone A. On the other hand, there is the chance of dropped object load exceeding the acceptance criteria in Zone B. It indicates that a piping protection system is required in Zone B. Nonlinear transient finite element analysis. After "hazard analysis" according to a set of selected dropped object scenarios, a new set of impact load scenarios should be determined for nonlinear dynamic finite element structural analysis. According to the ISO standards (ISO 19901-1, ISO 19901-3, ISO 19902) , nonlinear and dynamic effects need to be considered during the structural analysis under accidental loads such as drop impact, vessel collision, explosion, fire, etc. An advanced dynamic finite element simulation software package, LS-DYNA, is used to meet the ISO requirements for structural response in this study. Figure 3 shows the LS-DYNA finite element model. Impact load is calculated by the potential energy of the drop object which is converted to kinetic energy when the drop object hits the top center of the piping protection system. In this study, structural analyses were carried out for 11 different cases of impact loads: 49 kJ 245 kJ, 490 kJ, 736 kJ, 981 kJ, 1226 kJ, 1471 kJ, 1717 kJ, 1962 kJ 2207 kJ, and 2452 kJ, varying mass with constant. Although the same impact load is applied to a structure, structural responses can vary due to various parameters such as the impact area on the structure, size of the drop object, drop location, size of the structure (thickness, diameter, etc.), material properties, object stiffness relative to the structure, and boundary conditions.
Limited parameters are considered in this study, as the main purpose of this study is not to improve the accuracy of impact risk assessment but to describe its overall procedure based on the probabilistic approach. In this particular study for a topside protection, the impact area on the protection system varies only when the drop object length in x-direction changes. The following factors are not considered in this study: 1) the effect of drop object deformation; 2) secondary impact due to rebounding; 3) drop location; 4) thickness/diameter of protection pipes; and 5) boundary conditions. Table 2 . Dimensions of drop objects used for eight impact load cases.
Eight cases of structural analyses listed in Table 2 were additionally performed changing only drop object size along x, y, and z directions for each impact load case so as to roughly see the variation in structural response under the same accidental load in order listed in Table 2 .
Figure 4(a) shows the material behavior of the protection system, DH36 steel, during the tension test. It is assumed to fail when the stress falls just below 10% of the ultimate stress (f u ), where the corresponding failure strain (ε f ) is about 30% for DH36 while it is 40% in the experimental simulation. Such material properties, Y Z however, significantly change when the strain or stress rate increases or decreases because the steel is a rate dependent material. A strain rate model is incorporated in the LS-DYNA material card adopting Eqn. (1) where f o denotes the initial yield stress calibrated during the tension test, ε denotes the strain rate, and C and p are the Cowper-Symonds strain rate parameters. The parameters, C and p, are set at 40.4 and 5.0, respectively, in this study.
Figure 4(b) shows a sample stress-strain simulation at a finite element on the top of the protection system during the impact loading. Yield stress and ultimate stress are updated to 650 MPa and 1,010 MPa, respectively. Also, strain at ultimate stress (ε u ) changes to 35%, and it is found that if the prescriptive value is 0.3 the failure strain becomes 0.5, much larger than the prescriptive value, for DH-36 steel material. During the structural analysis, displacement-based responses such as strain, stress and deformation are produced. These responses, however, cannot represent the structural damage because local failure may sometimes lead to the failure of the entire system but it is also likely that local failure may be negligible depending on the location of the local failure. Therefore, it is necessary to evaluate damage at the system level based on damage at the material level for more precise structural performance. A methodology to reasonably quantify structural damage based on the material damage is proposed by Heo (2009) . A simple bilinear model is adopted, assuming that the damage index (D) is 0 until the strain reaches a damage threshold within elastic range in this case and 1.0 when accumulated plastic strain reaches the strain at the residual strength. Structural failure as well as damage state such as mild, moderate and severe damages can be determined by computed damage indices. In this study, it is assumed that the computed maximum plastic strains of the protection system represent the damage. Based on the selected resulting damage indices in terms of the maximum plastic strain (Table 3) , it is observed that the length change along the x-direction is more influential in the computed damages under the same impact energy compared to the y and z directions because the length in x-direction is directly related to impact area on the top of the protection. Although more scenarios for various length especially in x-direction are required to be added, only 88 data are used for regression analysis in this study.
Consequence analysis of the dropped objects.
A multi linear regression model for structural response can be established using the computed structural damage values described in the previous section. Impact energy merely counts as the drop impact parameter in this study to exemplify computing the predictive parameters of the regression model as 0 1 ln ln D c c E = + , where D is the expected value of structural damage derived by the maximum plastic strain of the protection system, E is the impact energy, and c 0 and c 1 are the unknown predictive parameters (-5.6464 and 0.7151, respectively) . The unknown parameters can be found by applying the actual values of the computed damage and the impact energy for the 88 selected scenarios shown in Table 3 to D and E, respectively. Figure 5 displays the actual structural damage computed by the LS-DYNA and the expected values (solid line). The regression model meets quite nicely the trend of the actual structural responses although it is necessary to improve the prediction in order to minimize the scatter in the response by adding more data and examining the other impact load parameters affecting the structural response. A structural fragility curve is created, which provides the exceedance probability of a damage state for the piping protection system at each level of impact energy. Heo (2009) presented details of the methodology of seismic fragility analysis that is adopted in this study. Drop impact risk calculation. For each drop impact energy range, multiplying the probability of damage state from the fragility curve by the rate of occurrence from the hazard curve gives the marginal rate of the damage state or worse. Summing up the marginal rates returns the risk value for exceeding a specific damage state (Table 4) . The resultant risk value can be evaluated by the acceptance criteria determined by mutual agreement among multidisciplinary expert groups of an offshore project or by the request of the owner. Assuming that the acceptance risk level is 10 -5 , the computed risk values for both cases are not acceptable. Hence, design change to reduce the risk is required in this example. 
